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.THE EXCLUSION OF THE CONCOURSE OF CAUSES
IN ITALIAN CRIMINAL LAW
Giulio Battaglini
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and Procedure at Sassari in 1911. From 1912 tutor in the Royal U. of Rome.
Professor in the same subject in Messina 1920. Called to the Royal U. of Pavia
in 1921. Subsequently Professor in the Catholic U. of Milan and the Royal
U. of Bologna. He now holds the chair of Crim. Procedure in the U. of Bari.
He practices as a lawyer. Consultant to the Ministry of Justice. As a polyglott
he has much first hand information as to foreign law and literature. Keen promotor
of international collaboration in criminological matters. Member of several It.
and for. A. etc.
Among his chief publications, the most prominent are "Diritto Penale" (3rd ed.
1949) and "II diritto di querela" (3rd ed. in print).
In the present article, regarding a subject of universal appeal, Prof. Battaglini
revives the interest of the readers of our JOURNAL. The first series of articles was
occasioned by his friends and colleagues, the late Professors James W. Garner
and John H. Wigmore.
The author has hitherto published in this JOURNAL as follows:
Function of Private Defense in the Repression of Crime 2 370.
Some Fundamental Problems of Criminal Politics 3 347.
Eugenics and the Criminal Law 5 12.
Fascist Reform of the Penal Law in Italy 24 278. -EDIToR.
SUMMARY
1. Pre-existing, simultaneous and supervening circumstances as autonomous
causal series. The present paper concerns above all the "supervening cause".-2.
The general provisions regarding causality in the Italian Penal Code.-3. The
supervening cause, specified by It. Penal Code as an exclusive one, is a necessary
antecedent, not a mere occasion.--4. The second paragraph of Art. 41 can be
rightly explained only by the theory of the "efficient cause".-5. Art. 40 and 41
are related to the objective side of crime.-6. The section deals with pre-existing and
simultaneous causes, as alone producing the event.-7. The different theories on
causality and the real purpose of the law.-8. Conclusions.
1. Pre-existing, simultaneous or supervening circumstances may con-
stitute autonomous causal series.
Our Penal Code expressly regulates the question as to the super-
vening cause, in the second paragraph of Article 41. Of this we will
especially treat in the present essay. We have here a complex case of
causality which is often presented by examination by judges in all coun-
tries, particularly in trials which deal with homicide and bodily injury.
In these trials, as it is well known, medical and other technical ex
aminations take place. Therefore, scholars in the law are not the only
ones who are interested in the subject of this discussion. The matter
is as old as the world itself. In fact, the jurisconsults of Rome con-
sidered this question,' though they did not deal with it from the point of
view of pure material cause, i.e., of mere objective nexus of causality
(see especially infra No. 5).
1. For example, we find in Roman texts the case of the slave who, mortally wounded,
dies as a result of the collapse of a building, or because of shipwreck or other physical
event. We find also the case of the slave who dies as a result of not having been treated
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From what we can observe in the last two decades of jurisprudence
relating to our Penal Code, the judge generally struck the mark when
he accepted or refused the argument of the supervenient cause as pos-
sessing exclusive relevancy.
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However, there is still among us a conflict of opinion as to the dog-
matic construction which would best adapt itself to the second para-
graph of Article 41. And this conflict is reflected in the uncertainty of
the concepts with which the judge reasons in order to arrive at his
conclusion.
The matter is thorny. So thorny that French legal doctrine deals
with it slightly, if at all, and resigns itself to the good sense of the
judge.
But the judge still has need of knowing what is cause and what is not
cause. And it is juridical doctrine itself which must furnish to the
Palace of Justice a concept of cause which, despite the thorniness of
the matter, should be generally understood.4
One cannot say that only one concept concerning causality can be of
worth in relation to a given legislation. We plan to show here, ir
summary fashion, our thesis according to what we consider to be the
thought contained in the second paragraph of Article 41 of the Italian
Penal Code. 5
2. The Italian Penal Code of 1930 includes in its first book
(which contains the general provisions) two Articles, Nos. 40 and
41, which relate to the objective casual connection. In order that the
reader may have these Articles before his eyes, we reproduce them
below.
for his injury. Both cases were resolved in the sense that the one who did the injury was
responsible de qulnerato, and not de occiso. See for the first case, fragment 15, par. 1,
ad legem Aquiliam, IX, 2; for the second one, fr. 30, par. 4, ad legem Aquiliam, IX, 2.
The subject of the nexus of causality in Roman law is amply treated by BEMn, TEORIA
GENERALE DELLE OBBLIGAZIONI IN DIRirrO ROMANO, I, Lezioni, Milano, Giuffri, 1947, nn.
26-36, pp. 109-174.
2. Many of the adjudicated cases concern street accidents.
3. See DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, TRAIT9 DE DROIT CRIMINEL ET DE LtGISLATION P9NALE
COMPARgE, 13th ed., Paris, Sirey, 1947, p. 82.
4. So much more should this concept be accessible to general understanding because
the concept of cause is of interest, not infrequently, in cases to be tried by jury or by
mixed benches, according to the countries involved. (In Italy the Court of Assizes is
composed of professional and of non-professional judges. It is now of two degrees, in
force of a recent law which has instituted also the Court of Assizes of Appeal. Against
the decisions of this latter, recourse is allowed, as to questions of law alone, to the Court
of Cassation).
5. Further inquiry on the subject in our study LA CAUSA SOPRAVVENUTA SUFFICIENTE DA
SOLA A DETERMINARE L'EVENTO, in "SCRITrI IN MEMOIUA DI ARTURo Rocco," Milan Giuffr6,
1952, vol. I, p. 117 ff. (Comprehensive review thereof in REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE,
1952, p. 340 ft.)
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Art. 40 entitled "The causal connection" and including two para-
graphs, disposes:
"No one may be punished for an act, specified in law as a crime, if
the injurious or dangerous event, on which the existence of the crime
depends, is not a consequence of his action or omission.
"Not to hinder an event which one is obliged by the law to hinder, is
equivalent to causing it."
Art. 41, entitled "Concurrent causes" and including three paragraphs,
deposes:
"The concourse of pre-existing, simultaneous, or supervening causes,
even if independent of the action or omission of the offender, does not
exclude the causal connection between the action or omission and the
event.
"Supervening causes exclude the causal connection when they alone
have been sufficient to determine the event. In such a case, if the earlier
action or omission constitutes in itself a crime, the penalty which covers
it is applied.
"The preceding provisions are applied even when the pre-existing,
simultaneous, or supervenient cause consists of another person's illegal
act."6
3. These two Articles constitute one of the most characteristic of
our legislation, not only with regard to preceding Italian legislation,
but also with regard to comparative law. In respect to causality, the
principle that inspired the lawmaker of 1930 was that of the equivalence
of all the antecedents of the event (theory of "equivalence" ).7
Concerning this the prevailing doctrine and jurisprudence are in ac-
cord.
But can the second paragraph of Article 41 also be referred to the
theory of equivalence? It confronts us with a peculiarity which cannot
6. The draft of a new Penal Code of 1949 regulates the subject matter in Articles
20 and 21.
Article 20 (entitled "Causal connection") is equivalent to present Article 40, save that at
the end of the second paragraph the following addition has been made: "nevertheless, the
punishment may be diminished."
Article 21 ("Concurrent Causes") includes four paragraphs, instead of three as in Article
41 of the Code in force today. The first and second remain unchanged. The new feature is
indicated by the third paragraph, which provides: "The punishment is diminished if the
pre-existing or simultaneous causes were unknown to the offender, or if the supervening
causes were independent of his action or omission, whenever they have had a noticeable
relevancy to the event." The fourth paragraph is equivalent to the third as we have it
today.
It is more than doubtful whether the concept of the "noticeable relevancy" laid down in
the third paragraph makes an improvement. Many have decisively affirmed that it increases
the difficulty of the subject.
7. Of particular importance is the application of the principle of equivalence dealing
with the participation of persons in the crime. (Article r1o ff. of the Italian Penal Code.)
1952]
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but strike us immediately. Here the phrasing, "independent of the
action or omission of the guilty one" is not repeated, in contrast with
the first paragraph of the same article. Therefore, it must be de-
duced that for the lawmaker the "interruption" of the causal nexus is
relevant, even where there might be a "dependence." In our juridical
doctrine and in jurisprudence, we find repeated about this point the
same conception which is contained in the preparatory works and in the
report of the keeper of the seals concerning the definitive project (Part
I, no. 58). According to this report, where a new causal series pos-
sessing full sufficiency supervenes, the simple and original action appears
irrelevant with respect to the final event, inasmuch as in relation to this
event it assumes the role of mere occasion.
Is the thesis of mere occasion compatible with the theory of equiva-
lence? To ask ourselves this question is indispensable. The answer
can be only in the affirmative. It is true that it can be observed that
regarding the verified event, not even the occasion can be suppressed
by the mind without the event itself failing to occur. If anything, this
is an affirmation of dependence (i.e., more correctly, of connection or
correlation), not causal, but simply occasional. Mere occasion (i.e.,
the favorable circumstances from which an action may or may not fol-
low), never necessarily postulates the event; from mere occasion the
event never arises de necessitate. This being the position of occasion
with relation to the event, occasion remains outside the causal nexus
since causality is not possible without a necessary connection.
However, in our opinion, in the cases in which a connection is offered
between the supervening cause and the original action, the phenomenon
of mere occasion cannot occur.
Let us take a law book example, particularly appropriate here be-
cause it clearly delineates the situation at hand. The example is that
of an injured person, who, having been brought to a hospital, dies
there as a result of a fire occurring later. Naturally, in the circum-
stances of the case to be decided, there is no place for a concurrent cause,
as there would be if, unlike other patients, our patient could not be
saved because of a difficulty arising from the peculiarity of the wound,
for example, an injury to the legs. Can it be said that the stay in the
hospital (a fact that reenters in the causal series posited by the injuring
party), represents mere occasioning in relation to the fire which has
killed by its own exclusive virtue? It is evident that the presence of the
victim in that place does not constitute a mere propitious atmosphere, a
mere attracting element, from which the event does not of necessity de-
[Vol. 43
ITALIAN CRIMINAL LAW
pend. We are dealing with quite a different matter. The stay in the
hospital is the circumstance without which the fire could not have taken
the life of the .patient. We are, therefore, dealing in most unequivocal
terms, with a conditio sine qua non with respect to the cause as on-
stituted by the fire.
Let us also suppose that a wounded man is brought into a clinic,
where, by a coincidence he falls into the hands of a doctor, who, what-
ever be the reason, nourishes an implacable hatred for him. If the
doctor injects a poison into the patient, thus killing him, can it be said
that the presence of the victim in the clinic was the propitious circum-
stance, the occasion for the doctor's crime, and that the causal series
posited by the injuring party is not contributory cause for such a reason.
Of course, at the beginning, it was a question of pure occasion because
the criminal action of the physician could or could not have followed;
but when the doctor acts to do away with the patient, a transition takes
place from occasion to condition, since then the presence of the subject
constitutes the element which is indispensable for the doctor's action
which brings about the death.
Concerning supervening causes, we do not think that there are pos-
sible cases wherein the ultimate force (through its sole power), de-
termines the final outcome by interfering with a mere occasion. That
which has placed the first agent into being may only constitute an in-
dispensable quid for the final force thus allowing it to operate.
Therefore, in order to place the second paragraph of Article 41 into
harmony with the theory of equivalence, one would have to ignore the
non-repetition of the phrase, "independent of the action or omission of
the guilty one." Its application would be limited to those rare cases of
so-called "real independence." For example, a person who was injured
on a moving train, afterward perished as all the other passengers did,
as a result of a bomb exploding on the tracks. Such an interpretation
would, however, be arbitrary, because it would disassociate itself from
the full consideration of the text of law. Incivile est, nisi tota lege per-
specta, judicare vel respondere. What would then be said of the two
decades of jurisprudence which has always moved toward a contrary
opinion? Has this jurisprudence applied perhaps only the preparatory
works, and not the law?
4. Since the text of our law unequivocally encompasses, also, cases
which the German doctrine places within the scheme of the so called
apparent independence, we hold that the sole theory that can safely be
deduced from this text is that of efficient cause.
19521
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This theory which is maintained in matters of causality in general
(i.e., not only in the question of supervening causes) by highly-placed
authorities on legal doctrine and not too infrequently followed ex-
plicitly or implicitly by jurisprudence, is as old as philosophic thought
itself. However, it cannot be transplanted in its pristine state from its
original field into ours. The jurist has to readapt it for his own ends.
Above all, an especially keen anlysis is required for the concept of oc-
casion which is of extreme importance and is still in need of clarifica-
tion.
The negation of the equivalence between cause and condition is
fundamental.
Cause is the antecedent which uniquely possesses, by its very nature,
the real generating force of the event considered by the law. It is the
antecedent which, by its intrinsic efficacy, by its real and fruitful in-
fluence, gives life to the event. It is that upon which a given event
intimately depends. Concurrent Cause is the antecedent which results
in being efficient in part only; its degree of efficiency, under the aspect
of objective causality is not of interest.
Condition is the circumstance by defection of which cause cannot
operate. The event is a necessary consequence both of cause and con-
dition. But the phenomenal datum of the necessary bond between the
antecedent and the subsequent is not enough, however, to establish
causality, because for this purpose one must look to the intrinsic nature,
to the "in itself" of the antecedent (necessary dependence or necessary
connection of causal character on the one hand, and on the other, neces-
sary dependence or necessary connection of merely conditional char-
acter).
Occasion (occasional cause or mere occasion) is different from cause
and condition: occasion is the coincidence, or the circumstance, or the
contingency more or less favorable to the intervention of the cause. The
action may or may not follow the occasion. That which eventually fol-
lows is never a necessary consequence of the occasion (a purely oc-
casional connection). The occasion does not possess productive strength
in any degree. One may also call this an inclining circumstance and
nothing else. If it were claimed to be a facilitating circumstance, it
would be saying too much, juridically speaking, since, e.g., he who, in
one way or another facilitates the commission of a crime, is a participant
in crime.
All these three kinds of antecedents, are established on account of
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their different intrinsic properties. If one or other of them occurs it
should be found from the evidence, in the concrete case.
It is not necessary to call for help on interpretations praeter legem
(by which one declares the impotence of juridical dogmatism), nor is
it necessary to go in search of conceptions of causality never imagined
by earlier scholars. On the basis of the distinction between cause and
condition and according to the doctrine of efficient cause, the second
paragraph of Article 41 can be easily understood. Here the legislator
has established a derogation to the principle of equivalence. Given this
obvious extension of the concept of the new causal series even with
respect to the supervening cause, though the latter remain "dependent"
on the original action (and it is here that the practical value of the
second paragraph lies), and with the assumption that the original action
can only be classified as a condition, it is therefore logically impossible
to reconstruct the thought of the law with the principle of equivalence.
For the theory of equivalence which amplifies the concept of cause,
as it maintains that we are in the presence of a cause whatever be the
manner of the necessary connection, in the case of the patient who
died in the hospital (where he had been taken because of his injury),
whether by the burning or destruction of the building as by lightning, the
original action, since it represents in itself a condition, can be nothing
else than a cooperating circumstance, i.e., a contributing cause.8
Someone has said: "If he had not been injured he would not have
died." However, this objection cannot hold against the theory of
efficient cause, since by such a theory which limits the notion of the cause
to that which is proper to its essence, even the conditio sine qua non,
however necessary it may be as an antecedent, is excluded from the
causality together with the occasion. If the real generating force,
"sufficient by itself," has been exclusively possessed by the supervening
factor, then it is this fact that decides the exclusion of the causal nexus.
The condition becomes irrelevant to the question of responsibility.
5. In a series of decisions of our judiciary there is mention of the
"exceptional" and of the "unforeseeable," which must be necessary in
the supervening cause in order that it be considered total and exclusive.
We maintain that this is an error, and we base our view on a precise
and rigorous dogmatic framework. The objective nexus of causality is
one thing; culpability (to this the exceptional and the unforeseeable are
logically related) is a far different thing. Let it not be said that nowhere
8. Cf. LisZT-SCHI-mT, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHTS, 26th. ed., par. 29, III.
In Italy, for a similar treatment, see, among others, VANNiNi, Istituzioni di diritto penale,
Parte generale, Firenze, Cya, 1939, p. 156, and in other writings by the same author.
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is it written that according to the Articles 40 and 41 of the Italian Penal
Code the nexus of causality must be necessarily one of simple material
or objective causality. It has not been so written, but it can, never-
theless, be considered, with good reason as certain.
First of all, it must be kept in mind that the formula "have been
sufficient in themselves" was substituted for the earlier "may be
sufficient in themselves," which had been read into the preliminary proj-
ect, with the precise aim-expressly declared in the final report to the
King (number 25)-of requiring that the judicial enquiry be brought
about ex post; to wit not in regard to the cause in the abstract, accord-
ing to the theory of adequate cause. This theory, however, it is formu-
lated, by its very nature postulates calculation by the actor, i.e., a sub-
jective quid. (Such a subjective quid is expressly indicated in the title
"Theorie der subjectiv-adequiiten Verursachung," used by von Kries in
his first work on adequate cause.) Secondly, it must be considered that
in the Code the first element of the crime-the material fact-(and
precisely in this fact does the objective nexus of causality reenter), is
regulated of itself logically, and his priority over the psychological ele-
ment. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that the supervening cause is
non-f ortuitive, and therefore unforseeable or not foreseen, nor that it
is extraordinary or exceptional or ultra-rare, and therefore improbable. 9
The criterion of the casual connection in concreto is also followed by
the American jurisprudence. For example, in the case of a person
mortally wounded, who after cutting his own throat soon died. Here
the death did not result from the first wound in the natural course of
events. But the Court, according to the test, reached the conclusion
that, when the death occurred, the wound inflicted by the defendant did
contribute to the event.1 °
In regard to the point relative to the existence or non-existence of the
material causality, the enquiry concerning culpability is an extraneous
one, like the enquiry which concerns the third element of the crime char-
acterized by punishability.1
For example, in legitimate defense there is the material fact as well as
the subjective element, but there is no crime because punishability is ex-
cluded. If to a wound that may be healed, produced by legitimate de-
fense, an independent disease is added (e.g., scarlet fever), from which
death occurs, the original action cannot be considered a concurrent cause.
9. Cf.ARTuRo Rocco in Annali di diritto e procedura penale, 1937, p. 593.
10. See People v. Lewis (California), in DEssIoN, CRIMINAL LAW, ADMINISTRATION AND
PUBLIC ORDER, Charlottesville, Va., 1948, p. 44-9 ff.
11. Concerning punishability as an element of the crime, see our DIRITTO PENALE. PARTE
GENERALE, 3rd. ed., Padua, Cedam, 1949, pp. 115 ff., p. 275 ff.
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6. As we have noticed at the beginning of the present paper, an
autonomous causal series, which, as such, cannot be regarded as co-
operating with the series posited by the defendant, can be realized also
by preexisting or.simultaneous circumstances. About this question no
word is found in the law.
As an example of preexisting cause we could imagine this. A has
taken a lethal poison and then he is mortally injured by B. If A died
because of the poison, which operates more quickly than the injury, B
will not be held responsible for accomplished homicide. A case of
simultaneous cause alone sufficient to determine the event could be that
of a person, who, in the same moment in which he receives a mortal
blow of a dagger, died of aneurism. If the latter circumstance is really
proved, the solution will be the same as in the preceding case.
Is it possible in these cases to apply analogically the second paragraph
of Article 41 ? It is not, because Article 14 of our "Provisions about
the law in general" forbids to extend the application of an exception to
a general rule beyond the cases considered by the law. Now, the second
paragraph of Article 41 constitutes precisely an exception to the general
rule put by the first paragraph, and so one cannot speak of analogical ap-
plication.
If it results that the event was not in the least "a consequence of the
action" of the offender, but totally the consequence of the prior swal-
lowing of a poison or of a simultaneous aneurism, as in our examples,
the judge may apply the first paragraph of Article 40. See the text of
this article supra, n. 2.
7. Some students of law, thinking the attempt to construct the
second paragraph of Article 41 with the more modern doctrine of
causality to be inane, became discouraged, and finally arrived at the
conclusion that the only possibility is a "conceptual interpretation." It
did not occur to them that the law in this particular provision might
require recourse to a non-modern conception of causality. De jure con-
dendo, we are at liberty to say what we will, according to our par-
ticular inclination. For the legal scholar, however, that which is para-
mount is the thought that is deduced from law, be it open to criticism or
not, be it modern or ancient.
There is one more fundamental point. Whatever the scheme of
causality, it cannot be imagined as serving automatically as litmus paper
serves the chemist. There will be those notorious or commonplace
episodes which perforce will give rise to difficulties in arriving at a
decision, despite scrupulous medical examination and careful judicial
1952]
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enquiry. The theorist can only contribute theories. The rest is subject
to the clinical eye of the judge.
8. The chief conclusions, which we have reached, are the following:
(1) We are in the field of material or objective causality;
(2) The second par. of Art. 41 is not an unsolvable conundrum,
perforce requiring a free opinion by the interpreter;
(3) Were the provision contained in Art. 41 inspired by the theory
of the "real independence," it would constitute a surplus;
(4) It is on the contrary an exception, which may be satisfactorily
explained only by resorting to the theory of the efficient cause;
(5) What decides is the causal connection in concreto;
(6) After having ascertained the objective causality, it remains to
enquire into the culpability and the punishability;
(7) Pre-exisiting and simultaneous causes, which have been solely
sufficient to produce the event, exclude the causal connection on the
basis of Art. 40, not of Art. 41.
